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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of military burden on economic growth and extends previous works on
the optimal size of government expenditure by exploring how external threat affects the preferences of the
households and, in turn, economic growth. Post World War II Italian data are used to estimate non-linear
growth models using time-series semi-parametric methods. The estimates show that total government
and civilian burdens are productive, whereas military burden has significant effects on economic growth
through the expenditure for peacekeeping missions which reduces the insecurity in the home country. This
may justify economically the current not negligible budget devoted to peacekeeping and humanitarian
missions.
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1. Introduction
The debate on the relationship between military spending and economic growth is largely inconclu-
sive for either the sign or the magnitude of these effects. The heterogeneity depends on the contrasting
outcomes that changes in military spending bring through several transmission channels identified from
the literature. In fact, military sector providing a variety of public infrastructures (e.g., dams, commu-
nication networks, roads, airports, highways, and other transportation networks) may help a country to
increase the physical capital, other than enhances human capital through education, nutrition, medical
care, and training. In addition, to R&D experiences, military spending may have a positive effect on
growth through complementarity effects on the private production inputs. Shieh et al. (2002) also show
that military spending may promote economic growth through internal and external security (Lipow &
Antinori, 1995; Aizenman & Glick, 2006; Pieroni, 2008), by boosting private domestic investments and
by attracting the foreign ones. On the other hand, Knight et al. (1996) and Looney (1997) show that
military spending is a constraint for economic growth at least because it obstacles the use of government
spending for civilian sector more productive in stimulating economic growth (peace dividend hypothesis).
From a neoclassical perspective, the effect of government spending mainly depends on the productivity
of the sector compared to the civilian one and on the amount of resources allocated to it through taxes.
These effects produce non-linearities in the relationship between public spending and economic growth.
A large body of empirical literature, taking cue from Barro (1990) and Devarajan et al. (1996), has
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confirmed the existence of non-linearities when total government spending is analyzed (Devarajan et al.,
1996; Mittnik & Neumann, 2003), even if Mittnik & Neumann (2003) show that it is not possible a priori
to extend this result to the of components of government expenditure. Indeed, this condition holds only
when the government component is productive, since in line with Barro (1990) and Devarajan et al.
(1996), unproductive public expenditures only affect the welfare level of the representative household,
but have no effect on economic growth. d’Agostino et al. (2011) apply this framework using post World
War II U.S. data and find that military sector is ”productive” and non-linear related to economic growth.
Taking cue from this literature, the present paper contributes to the endogenous growth literature
by showing that when external security levels in a given country are not constant over time, military
burden has a further positive impact on growth, independently from complementarities with the private
productive sector. Military burden stimulates economic growth through a greater perception of security
of consumers, which does not constraint consumption. The empirical analysis, drawn on a unique dataset
from 1960 to 2009 for Italy, identifies external security by the amount of resources devoted by the defense
sector to finance overseas peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.
The results indicate no complementary effects on private productive sector, although the reduction of
the external threat seems to stimulate growth. We show that, especially after the end of the Cold War,
Italian participation in terms of budget of government to the peacekeeping and humanitarian missions
is positively linked to economic growth.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the analytical framework to analyze
the relationship between military spending and economic growth, whereas an historical overview of the
defense budget and sources for Italy are presented in Section 3. Section 4 provides the main findings of
the analysis and Section 5 concludes the paper through the suggestion of policy implications.
2. Theoretical framework
In this section, we setup an endogenous growth model to characterize the relations among military
sector and the rate of economic growth. The proposed model is an extension of the ones proposed by
Barro (1990); Devarajan et al. (1996) and d’Agostino et al. (2011, 2012).
Consider an economy consisting of a representative household and government producing a single
composite commodity which can be accumulated as capital, consumed or paid as an income tax. Gov-
ernment provides the entire amount of public spending, namely total government spending Gt. In turn,
Gt can be decomposed into government spending functional components namely military spending g1t
and civilian spending g2t. Total government spending and its functional components are linked by the
following rule:
Gt = g1t + g2t (1)
which states that government allocates public sources to each sector in such a way to maintain budget
constraint, and any change in the allocation mechanism in one sector also influences the amount of
resources to the other ones (from now on additivity Assumption).
Let us assume that military spending enters into both the representative household utility function
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and into the production function, whereas civilian spending enters only into the production function.
Shieh et al. (2002) argue that when the households set his preferences in such a way to maximize his
utility, also security needs which depend on his perception of the internal and external threat levels
in the country will be taken into account. Therefore, in the maximization process he will need a given
amount of military spending which guarantees to the household its maximum utility. However, as argued
by Barro (1990), military sector may also show complementary effects to private investments through
R&D, infrastructures, and human capital. Since military sector may have a doubled impact on economic
growth, depending on whether it is introduced into the production or in the utility function, we include
in the model the assumption that household’s preferences are affected by security. Formally:
A1: Let us assume that internal threat is constant. We identify the external threat by the inverse of
military spending in overseas peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. This implies that security
of households is inversely linked to external threat.
The assumption is in accordance with the findings by Polachek & Seiglie (2007) in which the stability
of neighboring countries becomes crucial for the economic performance of the home country. In the Italian
context the perception of security becomes more marked given the persistent instability and conflicts
of many countries in the Mediterranean region, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995-2002), Yugoslavia
(1992-1995) or, more recently, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.
2.1. The household maximization framework
Given the structure of government, the representative household derives his utility from private
consumption per worker ct and military spending g1t. By using a CES utility function of the form
U(ct, g1t) =
[
(ctg
η
1t)
1−σ − 1
]
upslope1− σ, the objective of the household is to maximize the discounted sum
of future instantaneous utilities:
U =
∫ ∞
0
[
(ctg
η
1t)
1−σ − 1
]
1− σ e
−ρt (2)
where ct = Ct/Lt is the consumption rate per-worker and ρ is the subjective discount rate. In (Shieh
et al., 2002), η measures the impact of government services on the welfare of the household even if,
alternatively, it can measure the effectiveness of services provided by the government (d’Agostino et al.,
2011); σ describes the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution between private consumption
and military spending.
The representative household is bounded at any instant of time by a private capital accumulation
constraint, which is a function of private capital per-worker, kt, military spending, g1t and civilian
spending, g2t and is given by:
k˙ = (1− τ)Ak1−α−βt gα1tgβ1t − c (3)
where τ describes the tax rate. The production function, characterized by a Cobb-Douglas functional
form, is given by:
yt = Ak
1−α−β
t g
α
1tg
β
1t (4)
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where yt is the output per-worker. In such framework, the government is assumed to collect income
tax revenues τyt to finance total spending Gt, distributing them among military and civilian sectors.
Denoting by θ and 1− θ the fraction of resources devoted to each public sector, we have that:
Gt = τyt = g1t + g2t (5)
g˙1
g1
= θGt = θτ
yt
g1t
(6)
g˙2
g2
= (1− θ)Gt = (1− θ)τ yt
g2t
(7)
where equation 5 states the government budget constraint which is balanced by the government at any
instant of time, and equations 6 and 7 describe the linkage between military and civilian spending and
the amount of resources devoted to each public sector. Equations 6 and 7 allow for an accumulation
process of public resources in each public sector, and it is proportional to production output yt. This
model formulation differs from the ones proposed by Barro (1990) and Devarajan et al. (1996) since these
models suppose that all the allocated spending must be consumed at the end of each period, not allowing
for an accumulation process of public resources in each sector. On the contrary, this model formulation
is in line with Shieh et al. (2002) since, using equations 6 and 7 with g10/g20 = θ/1 − θ , we have the
following relation between g1t and g2t:
g1t
g2t
=
θ
1− θ (8)
2.2. The market solution
Given the previous framework, the representative household chooses private consumption so as to
maximize the discounted sum of utilities (2), subject to (3), given initial private capital k0. We only look
the market solution of the household optimization process. This means that the household is not able
to choose the optimal amount of public goods to consume or to use within the entrepreneurial activity,
but to consider them as given. The resultant growth equation is then given by:
γ =
c˙
c
=
1
σ
[
(1− σ)ηg1t + (1− τ)(1− α− β)yt
kt
− ρ
]
(9)
Equation (9)1 is composed by two different parts: i) (1−σ)ηg1t which accounts for the impact of military
spending through the utility function, and ii) (1 − τ)(1 − α − β) ytkt describing the link among g1t and
g2t and private capital kt in the production function yt. In more detail, the first part of equation (9)
describes the linear link between military spending and economic growth performance depending on the
household security perception. As it is clear from the equation, when the inverse of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution between private consumption and military spending σ is equal to 1, this term
becomes zero. The restricted model can be written when external threat in a given country remains
constant over time, and consequently the representative household will be indifferent to consuming an
additional unit of military spending or private consumption. When this hypothesis holds, this model
1From a mathematical point of view, the first part of equation 9 is obtained by using equations 6 and 8.
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formulation converges to the one proposed by d’Agostino et al. (2011, 2012); that is:
γ =
c˙
c
=
1
σ
[
(1− τ)(1− α− β)yt
kt
− ρ
]
(10)
Figure 1: Specification of the endogenous growth models
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Notes: Notes: the graph adopts: ρ = 0.02, A1/β = 0.113, α = 0.75, β = 0.75, and σ = 0.7. In left panel, the
dash line describes growth rate behavior from the proposed model (9) for g1t following equation (10). On the right
panel, it is described growth rate behavior for g2t.
Figure 1 describes the behavior of the growth equations (9) and (10) for different amounts of resources
devoted to military (g1t) and civilian (g2t) sectors. In the left panel, the dash line describes the growth
rate behavior of the model (9), whereas the continuous line accounts for the ones in 10. Since civilian
spending does not enter into the utility function, the right panel shows only its link with the growth rate
in the production function which coincides in (9) and (10). From the Figure, we depict two important
considerations. First, the models predict a non linear relationship between military (civilian) spending
and economic growth, allowing either for positive or negative links. In particular, if the relative shares
of public expenditure devoted to each good are below their relative output elasticities, shifts in the mix
toward a given good increase the economy long-run growth, whereas the relationship is negative in the
opposite case. Second, as showed in the left panel, the linear effect of military spending increases growth
rate from g∗1t to g
∗∗
1t , given by the reduction of external insecurity when government spends on military
activities.
Finally, when we restrict the proposed model to determine the optimum allocation of total government
spending allocated among public sectors, it converges to the Barro’s (1990) endogenous growth model.
When the share of government spending on the GDP growth rate is found to be at the optimum, this
becomes the whole amount of resources to be allocated around military and civilian sectors. Formally:
γ =
c˙
c
=
1
σ
[
(1− τ)
(
Gt
kt
)α
− ρ
]
. (11)
Following this model formulation the optimal amount of total government spending Gt is now a
function of its relative share compared to private capital and of its productivity level.
5
3. Data
3.1. Concepts, definitions and patterns of military sector in Italy.
In Italy, competences and expenditures in the military sector are shared among Defense Ministry,
Ministry of Economy and Ministry of Economic Development. This has determined different classifi-
cations of the defense function (Nascia & Pianta, 2009). In particular, one is built according to the
NATO definition, while another is based on the Italian Defense ministry. The first classification includes
all current and capital expenditure on armed forces, peacekeeping forces, Defense Ministry and other
government agencies engaged in defense projects, paramilitary forces available for military operations
and military space activities2. Instead, the classification of the Italian Defense ministry budget does not
include the expenses for peacekeeping missions relative to interdepartmental programs and some of the
costs of the paramilitary forces used for public security as police forces.
Following these classifications, we define military spending in the first case and extract data from
the annual compendium of financial, personnel and economic data published by NATO whereas we
define defense spending in the second case and extract data from the Annual General Report of Italian
Government.
Figure 2: Patterns of military and defense burdens and their functional components
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Notes: Military spending is extracted by the annual compendium of financial, personnel and economic data published by
NATO whereas, defense spending is extracted by the Italian Government General Report of Cash Flow, 1960-2009. Both
these variables are expressed as ratio of per-capita GDP. The right panel of the graph reports the percentage shares on GDP
of military equipment (mil equi), infrastructure (mil infr), personal (mil per) and peacekeeping missions (mil peace).
The variables are extracted by the annual compendium of financial, personnel and economic data published by NATO.
Figure 2a reports patterns of military (milt) and defense (deft) spending as share in GDP between
1960 and 2009. As showed by the figure, it is possible to characterize the behavior of these two series
by three main phases. The first, from 1974-1975, is determined by a change in public policy, producing
a sharp decrease in military spending of 3.6%, due mainly to a reduction of military investments. The
2The areas of defense sector cover a large variety of expenditure including: i) personnel, relating to the costs incurred for
salaries and allowances of military and civilian personnel, and for the treatment of provisional pensions of military personnel;
ii) maintenance, relative to the costs necessary to ensure the functionality and efficiency of the military like training costs,
preservation of materials and infrastructure; iii) investment, relative to the costs required to improve the effectiveness of the
military, like expenses for modernisation and renewal of operational resources, technical support, logistics, infrastructure,
research and development. This aggregation does not includes civil defense, current expenditure for previous military
activities, veteran benefits, demobilization, conversion of arm production facilities and destruction of weapons.
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rise in oil prices has justified an expansion of non-military public spending to reduce social emergencies
generated by the World economic crisis, substituting the expenditures for military sector. The second
phase, during the eighties, is characterized by a new cold war and a policy in line with the United States,
which led to a new period of growth in military spending. Both military and civilian spending grow on
average at a rate of 5.8% and 5.6 %, respectively, whereas, for the first time, armaments play a significant
role in the composition of military spending. This phase ends with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989
and the dissolution of the Soviet union in 1991, which caused the subsequent end of the Cold War and a
substantial reduction in expenditure commitments. As a consequence, military expenditure, from 1989
to 1995, decreased on average at a rate of 2%, while public spending remained stable. Starting from
1995, the third phase is marked by an overall reduction of government spending and, particularly, of
military spending (about -5.6%). The decrease of military spending is alleviated increasing expenditures
in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, starting with the Balkan war, with the Italian participation
in NATO air strikes against Serbia and the international missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.
We summarize the trends in military and defense spending in Italy through two main futures. First,
the composition of military (or defense) spending has not been stable along the period, with decreasing
behaviors during the economic crises depicted, principally, by a reduction in armaments, without any
significant variation in current expenditures (such as personnel spending). This predominance of current
spending is showed in Figure 2b, where we report the percentage shares on GDP of military equipment
(mil equi), infrastructure (mil infr), personal (mil per) and peacekeeping missions (mil peace). Sec-
ond, the expenditure increases in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions generate in the recent period
discrepancies between military and defense expenditures. In particular, these differences are important
for Italy during the period 1996-2003 (on average 25% of military spending) when Italy has been involved
in NATO and UN interventions3.
3.2. Other variables
To complete the model, total government spending govt is extracted by the source ”Italian Govern-
ment Cash Flow”. This variable includes all current expenditures for goods and services (including the
compensation of employees). It also accounts for all the expenditures for government capital formation
and on national defense and security, but excludes all the expenditures for interest rates on public debt.
Two important remarks are necessary. govt considers the expenditures of the ministries and so its com-
position may slightly change during the considered time span. However, this aspect does not influence
the results when we consider the aggregate variables. Secondly, since in 1975 govt includes also National
Health Services, extended by law to all citizens and the amount of social pensions. This further account-
ing may produce a structural break in the series that have to be considered in the empirical analysis. For
this purpose, we construct a shift dummy (d1975), which is equal to 1 from 1975 on, that accounts for
an intercept shift due to National Health Services and the amount of social pensions. We also include in
the model specification an impulse dummy variable to account for the effect of the 2008 economic crisis
(d2008).
3Following the Stockholm Institute of Peace Research (SIPRI), Italy has been involved into 11 peacekeeping missions
between 1948 and 1990, whereas they more than doubled between 1990-2010.
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4. Econometric framework
This section provides a discussion of the empirical investigation from equations (9), (10) and (11).
However, before presenting the mathematical derivation of these models, we illustrate the test for the
presence of non-linearities into the proposed growth models.
4.1. The non-linearity test
We start considering a non linear AR(p) model where we allow both for I(0) and I(1) time series xt,
t = 1, ..., T . Following Vogelsang (1998), we can apply a modified test statistic whose asymptotic null
critical value are the same in both case. Harvey & Leybourne (2007) make empirically tractable the test
by including non-linear functions f(xt−1, θ) and f(∆xt−1, θ). By considering a general case which allows
AR(p) specification, the model is written as,
xt = µ+ vt
vt = λ1vt−1 + λ2v2t−1 + λ3v
3
t−1 + λ5∆v
2
t−1 + λ6∆v
3
t−1 +
p∑
j=1
λ4,j∆vt−j + εt (12)
with εt ∼ IID(0, σ2). As shown in Kapetanios et al. (2003), the reduced form of the non-linear model
can be obtained recursively and written as,
xt = δ0 + δ1xt−1 + δ2x2t−1 + δ3x
3
t−1 + δ5∆x
2
t−1 + δ6∆x
3
t−1 +
p∑
j=1
δ4,j∆xt−j + εt (13)
where
∑p
j=1 β4,j∆xt−j is the additional serial correlation that enters linearly in the equation (13).
A Wald test under linearity is implemented from the residuals of this fitted model and the residuals
obtained from the following restricted model,
xt = pi0 + pi1xt−1 +
p∑
j=1
γj∆xt−j + εt. (14)
As proved by Harvey & Leybourne (2007), we can also test the hypothesis of non-stationarity pi1 = 1
in the restricted model (14) by a t-statistic that is derived from a transformation of the Dickey Fuller
statistic. A summary of the Harvey-Leybourne test is presented in Table 1.
Furthermore, under the hypothesis that government spending is nonlinear and stationary, we write
a smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) model of the continuous transition variable st in order to
estimate the effects of government spending components on economic growth. The general framework is
given as,
yt = φ
′zt + θ′ztG (η, c, st) + ut with ut ∼ iid(0, σ2) (15)
where zt is a vector of explanatory variables and φ = (φ0, φ1...., φm)
′ and θ = (θ0, θ1...., θm) are ((m +
1)x1) parameter vectors of the linear and nonlinear part of the model, respectively. The transition
function G(.) is a bounded function of the continuous transition variable st, the slope parameter η and
the vector of location parameters, c = (c1, ....ck). Following Lutkepohl (2004), a sequential strategy
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Table 1: Summary of hypotheses tests
Harvey-Leybourne test
H1 : δ2, δ3, δ5, δ6 = 0 Linear AR(p) process
H2 : pi1 = 1 Stationary AR(p) process
Granger-Tera¨svirta test
H01 : β1 = β2 = β3 = 0 Linear model selection.
H02 : β1 = 0|β2 = β3 = 0 LSTR(1) with one transition variable and one regime change.
H03 : β1 = 0|β2 = 0 LSTR(2) with one transition variable and two regime changes.
H04 : β3 = 0 EXPAR where transition states are more than two.
Notes: The Harvey-Leybourne (2007) test has for H1 is based on the Wald statistic, which has χ
2-distribution with
four degrees of freedom. The stationarity hypothesis H2 is based on a augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic (ADF-test),
with t-distribution. The Granger-Tera¨svirta (1993) test is based on F-statistic, with 3m and T − 4m degrees of
freedom.
for testing the non-linear function is derived using the logistic smooth transition (LSTR) model. A
third-order Taylor expansion around the hypothesis η = 0 means the following specifications can be
identified4:
a) asymmetric behavior in the hypothesized relationship (i.e. one change in the growth-government
spending function, model LSTR(1));
b) a process with heterogeneous dynamic properties between both large and small values of and
central values (model LSTR(2));
c) an Exponential Autoregressive model (EXPAR), an alternative of LSTR(2) when η is not close to
zero (Granger & Tera¨svirta, 1993).
Going back to the theoretical framework, the assumption of additive government expenditure compo-
nents means that the share of government spending in GDP can be used as the predetermined transition
variable. Methodologically, this implies distinguishing between two different cases depending on the
inclusion or exclusion of the transition variable from zt. When the nonlinear relationship uses total gov-
ernment spending as in equation (11), the transition variable is incorporated in zt, giving the auxiliary
regression:
yt = β
′
0zt +
3∑
j=1
β′j z˜ts
j
t + u
∗
t (16)
where the parameterization yields a vector zt = (1, z˜t), in which z˜t is a (mx1), and u
∗
t = ut +
R3(η, c, st)θ
′zt where the residual is R3(η, c, st). For other growth model specifications, the size of
the total government spending in GDP transition variable is not an element of zt and the empirical
specification is given as:
yt = β
′
0zt +
3∑
j=1
β′jzts
j
t + u
∗
t (17)
The null hypothesis of linearity β1 = β2 = β3 = 0 is then tested against the alternative hypotheses
shown in Table 1 using the strategy described above. The nonlinear model yields one choice among the
available nonlinear specifications by the p-value. If the test gives the strongest rejection, the efficient
4A summary of the Granger-Tera¨svirta test is presented in Table 1.
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nonlinear models have to be LSTR(2) or EXPAR specifications, while if the p-value is greater than the
usual 5% or 10%, the LSTR(1) model is not rejected.
4.2. Estimation issues of STAR models
From equation (15), with a transition variable and one regime change, the specification of the dynamic
model can be estimated by defining zt as a vector that includes the lagged values (p) of the endogenous
and exogenous variables. The specification of the vector zt depends on the type of public spending we have
analyzed. When the estimation of the Barro’s model is approached, we define zt = (1, γt−h, invt, Git−h)
and the resulting STAR specification becomes:
γt = φ0 + φ1γt−1 + .....+ φpγt−p + φp+1invt + θ1Gt−1(Gt) + .....+ θpGt−p(Gt) + µt, (18)
with γt−h the lagged per-capita GDP growth rates, invt the fitted share of private investment in GDP
and Gt−h the share of total government spending in GDP. Moreover, when we consider military (milt)
and non-military (non milt) burden, we can define zt = (1, γt−h, invt,milt−h, non milt−h) and the STAR
model as:
γt = φ0 + φ1γt−1 + .....+ φpγt−p + φp+1invt + θ1milt−1(Gt)
+ .....+ θpmilt−p(Gt) + θp+1non milt−1(Gt) + ........+ θ2pnon milt−p(Gt) + µt
(19)
whereas, when we consider defense (deft) and non-defense (non deft) burdens, we can define zt =
(1, γt−h, invt, deft−h, non deft−h) in order to have a specification given by:
γt = φ0 + φ1γt−1 + .....+ φpγt−p + φp+1invt + θ1deft−1(Gt)
+ .....+ θpdeft−p(Gt) + θp+1non deft−1(Gt) + ........+ θ2pnon deft−p(Gt) + µt
(20)
Hence, once the transition variable st and the transition function G (η, c, st) have been selected, we can
approach the estimation of the parameter vector Θ = (φ′, θ′, η, c) in the STAR model (15) through
nonlinear least square [NLS]. Under the assumption that the errors ut are normally distributed, the NLS
is equivalent to the maximum likelihood. Issues deserving particular attention in the estimation include
the sum of squares function, the choice of starting values for the parameters and the estimation of the
smoothness parameter η in the transition function (van Dijk et al., 2002). In particular, it is difficult to
obtain very accurate estimate of the smoothness of the transition between the two regimes characterized
by η, when the parameter is large. This is due to the fact that for such large values of η, the STAR
model is similar to a threshold model, and the transition function comes close to a step function. To
obtain accurate estimates of η, one then need many observations in the immediate neighborhood of c,
since in this case even large values of η have a small effect on the shape of the transition function. The
choice of the parameters η and c is then made through a graphical analysis of the latter parameters in
the minimization of the square function (van Dijk et al., 2002).
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4.2.1. Post-estimation tests for the STAR model
The adequacy of the estimates through the STAR model is subjected to a number of misspecification
tests. These evaluations are carried out through tests of no-residual autocorrelation, no remaining
nonlinearity and parameter constancy. Eitrheim & Terasvirta (1996) develop LM-type tests for these
three hypotheses in the basic two-regime STAR model. In this context, the tests of no remaining
nonlinearity and parameter constancy can be interpreted as tests against the alternatives of a multiple
regime STAR model.
In detail, the non-residual autocorrelation test measures the serial independence of the error term
ut by using the skeleton of Equation (15) (van Dijk et al., 2002). The resultant statistical test is
asymptotically distributed as a χ2 with q degrees of freedom corresponding to the lags of the error
term which are considered. This test is a generalization of the linear LM test statistic of non-residual
autocorrelation. The test for absence of non-linearity uses the same structure described in the last part
of Section 4.1 and is based again on a third-order Taylor expansion of equation (15). The resultant test
statistic has an asymptotic χ2 distribution with 3m degrees of freedom. Finally, the parameter constancy
in the two-regime STAR model, against the alternative of smoothly changing parameters is taken into
account. The appropriate LM-type test statistic based on a third-order Taylor approximation has the
same asymptotic distribution of the previous test statistic.
4.3. The linear autoregressive model
Following Chen (1993) and van Dijk et al. (2002), we can characterize the autoregressive model AR
as a restricted version of the STAR model (as in Equation 15) under the assumption that the transition
function G() is constant over time. Since we are interested in analyzing the impact of military sector
(i.e., military spending or defense spending) on growth also through its impact on the utility function
(described by the first part of Equation 9), we specify an AR(p) of military burden, defense spending
in GDP and a disaggregation of military spending, in particular the expenditures in peacekeeping and
humanitarian missions (mil peacet). In according to the previous formulations, we define a partitioned
vector Wt = [milt; deft; mil peacet] so that the AR(p) model is specified as:
γt = a0 + a1γt−1 + .....+ asγt−s + atinvt + b1Wt + .....+ bsWt−s + t, witht ∼ iid(0, σ2) (21)
It is important to stress that, since in the first part of Equation (9), which is related to the effect on
household of a greater security, enters only military or defense spending, but not the civilian counterparts
as in (20), we do not need to maintain in this context the additivity assumption. This means that we
are able to account for the impact of expenditures in the defense function, excluding from the analysis
the other ones. The accuracy of the model specification is still proved by an LM-type test for a non
remaining auto-correlation and by a LM-type test for normality in the error term.
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5. Results
According to the empirical framework, we present the main findings applied to the Italian economy.
A preliminary analysis serves to extract the most appropriate model specification. Since the additivity
condition is hold with respect to total government spending, the results of the preliminary analysis are
valid for military or defense spending, and for its functional government components of expenditure.
Table 2: Results of the AR(1) model for GDP growth rate.
I II
γt−1 -0.448 *** -0.362 ***
(0.129) (0.106)
d invt 1.718 *** 1.393 ***
(0.233) (0.199)
govt−1 -0.002 -0.026
(0.032) (0.026)
Constant 8.904 *** 8.908 ***
(1.208) (0.977)
Trend -0.178 *** -0.153 ***
(0.022) (0.019)
d1970 -4.583 ***
(1.093)
d2009 -3.505 ***
(1.142)
R2 0.743 0.832
adjusted R2 0.719 0.808
LM-test for residual 0.002 0.046
autocorrelation (1 lag) (0.959) (0.828)
Normality test 0.002 0.003
(0.959) (0.962)
Notes: The table reports the estimation results from the condi-
tional AR(1) model for growth rate in GDP. In parenthesis, we re-
port the standard errors, while the asterisks stand for the p-value
significance levels. We have that ∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p <
0.01.
Table 2 reports the results from the AR(p) model with one lag in endogenous and exogenous vari-
ables5. The first column of Table 2 includes the benchmark model formulation, where we have excluded
the deterministic components, whereas the second column introduces the dummy variables accounting
for the recent economic crisis and for the intercept shift after the inclusion of welfare reform in 1975.
The inclusion of these deterministic components stabilizes the standardized residuals as shown in the
first panel of Figure 3.
Table 2 shows that all the variables except for total government spending are significant with the
expected signs, whereas all the deterministic components contribute to variance reduction. The non-
significance of total government spending may be in line with the expectations, since the linear model
formulation does not take into account the presence of two opposite regimes, depending on the initial
amount of resources allocated to public sector and the relative productivities of total government spending
compared to the one of private investments (see section 2). This result is clarified by panel b of Figure 3,
where we report recursive estimations for total government spending, along with bootstrapped standard
5Lag selection, not reported, is based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Final Prediction Error (FPR), Hannan-
Quinn Criterion (HQC), Schwarz Criterion (SC). All the proposed selection criteria suggest an optimal number of lags
for the endogenous and exogenous variables equal to 1. Since private investment invt does not reject the assumption of
unit-root (as described in Table 3), in the estimations we use this variable in first difference.
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Figure 3: Patterns of standardized residuals and recursive estimations
(a) Standardized residuals (b) Recursive estimation of gov parameter
Notes: Panel a) shows the standardized residuals from the estimation of the first column of Table 1, whereas panel b) shows
recursive estimations for total government spending, based on the estimations of column II.
errors. As showed by the figure before the 80’s, where the amount of resources allocated to public
sector were lower, we have a positive impact of total government spending of economic growth of GDP,
whereas, after that period, the parameter swings around the zero. This suggest that the instability of
the estimated coefficients may explain the negative sign of govt−1 in both columns of Table 2.
Given the deterministic structure of the model and the optimal lag structure, Table 3 lists the
unit root6 and the non-linear tests for each series, along with Granger-Tera¨svirta test for each growth
equations (19), (20) and (21). The specifications proposed for Granger-Tera¨svirta test uses time trend
and dummy variables accounting for 1975 structural break and 2008 economic crisis in the linear part
of the model. The upper part of Table 3 (columns 2 and 3), shows that the null hypothesis of a unit
root is accepted when we analyze private investments, whereas military and defense expenditures are
stationary when we include a trend into the estimations. Moreover, from columns 4 and 5, we show
that the Harvey & Leybourne (2007) test rejects the linearity hypothesis only when total government
spending govt (p−value of 0.092), non-military spending non milt (p−value of 0.073), and non-defense
spending non deft (p − value of 0.063) are considered. All the remaining variables, including military
and defense spending accept the null hypothesis of linearity. On the contrary, the Granger-Tera¨svirta
test (lower part of Table 3) suggests a non-linear specification of the proposed models7 considering
both total government spending and military/non-military and defense/non-defense aggregations. These
results appear to be not in line with our theoretical framework when military and defence spending are
considered, since the Harvey & Leybourne (2007) test does not reject the non-linearity hypothesis for
military and defense spending. Here, we suggest an explanation for these results. That is, even if military
and defense spending are, at least in Italy, classified unproductive, it does not exlude an effect of these
variables through the utility function, a mechanism that may be responsible for a significant impact on
6It is important to stress that the hypothesis of stationary is a necessary condition for testing a linear endogenous
growth model against a non-linear model specification
7Taking into account a linear model as benchmark specifications, there is a strong evidence for the presence of non-
linearities. The results show that the null hypothesis of linearity (H01 hypothesis) can be rejected in favor of the alternative
hypothesis for every specification. Within the group of non-linear specifications, the LSTR(1) specification is always
selected, as linearity is rejected most strongly for this form of non-linear model (H02 hypothesis).
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Table 3: Preliminary tests non-linear model formulation
a Non-linearity tests for single variables (Harvey-Leybourne test statistic)
Unit root test Non-linearity test
coefficient p− value coefficient p− value
Growth rate of GDP γt 25.474 0.000 18.932 0.000
Share of private investment in GDP invt -1.287 0.635 3.566 0.058
First difference of the share of private invest-
ment in GDP
∆invt -4.402 0.000
Total government spending in GDP govt 2.489 0.098 2.460 0.092
Military spending in GDP milt 1.764 0.190 2.8576 0.581
Military spending in GDP* milt 8.283 0.006
Non-military spending in GDP non milt 2.415 0.096 3.196 0.073
Defense spending in GDP * deft 1.980 0.166 2.452 0.345
Defense spending in GDP deft 8.793 0.004
Non-defense spending in GDP non deft 2.346 0.940 3.430 0.063
b. Non-linearity F-tests for model specification, Granger-Tera¨svirta test (p− value)
H01 H04 H03 H02
I Total government spending 0.027 0.080 0.214 0.046 LSTR1
II Military and non military spending 0.014 0.028 0.588 0.022 LSTR1
III Defense and non-defense spending 0.042 0.135 0.158 0.076 LSTR1
Note: In this Table we report the linearity test for the government expenditures and its functional components by Harvey &
Leybourne (2007) test. Granger & Tera¨svirta (1993) test shows the strategy for selecting the model. F-statistic values are reported
for each of the four hypotheses. The asterisks (∗) show that the linearity hypothesis for the Granger & Tera¨svirta (1993) test are
not rejected at the 5% level. ∗∗ Coherently with the non-linear models of the Table1, we report the values of the specification
where the government component is the share of non-military spending in GDP. Because we use as transition variable the share of
total government, the additivity condition with the share of military spending in GDP determines the same F-test results of the
model II.
growth. Indeed, since in the analysis of the non-linear part of equation (9) the additivity assumption
should be hold, we are not able to test (through the Granger-Tera¨svirta test) each series separately. As
a consequence, since non-military and non-defense spending are predominant burdens, the acceptance
of non-linearity assumption in Granger-Tera¨svirta test may be driven by these variables which account
for more than 95% of total government spending on average. Furthermore, the Granger-Tera¨svirta test
suggests a LSTR(1) model specification when total government spending is used as a transition variable,
for each proposed specifications.
Before presenting the main results from estimations through LSTR(1) models, Figure 4 introduces
the negative of the sum of squares function QT (η, c) and the transition function versus the transition
variable gt (in our case total government spending), which are used to set the initial values of parameters
c, η in the LSTR(1) estimations (van Dijk et al. (2000)). We recall that, parameter c determines the
transition point where the shape of the function changes, whereas η describes the transition speed. The
panel b of the figure shows that for fixed values of c the sum of squares of the QT function is not flat
in the direction of η. As a consequence, also for large values of η, the value of the logistic transition
function changes from 0 to 1 almost instantaneously at c, and the large changes in η have only little
14
Figure 4: Logistic Smooth Transition model preliminaries
(a) Transition function versus gt (b) Negative of the sum of squares function QT (η, c)
effect on the shape of the function (see section 4). This outcome suggests that our estimation results
remain robust also for large values of η.
Smooth transition regression (LSTR(1)) estimates are presented in Table 4. The first column of
the table reports the estimation for total government spending whereas, in the last two columns, are
reported the estimates for military/non-military and defense/non-defense, respectively. At the bottom
of the table, we present the diagnostic of estimation. As a first outcome, from all the columns of the
table, we find that the parameters of the linear part of the model (upper part of the table) are similar
to the ones estimated in Table 1, and the deterministic components are still significant.
In particular, the estimations presented in Table 4 highlight three main results. First of all the
optimal amount of total government spending, described by parameter c, is around 36% of GDP. This
result seems reasonable for Italy where total government spending includes both social security and
welfare spending and where the total government burden has reached values higher than 45% of GDP.
This result does not change for each of the proposed models, showing that the additivity assumption is
satisfied. Secondly, since in recent years total government spending in GDP has been lower the 36%,
we have that govt−1 has a positive impact on growth even if not so large (0.372). A similar outcome
is found when non-military spending (0.343) and non-defense spending (0.361) are taken into account.
This suggests that civilian spending has a behavior that follows the one of total government spending
in Italy. Thirdly, as showed by column 2 and 3, military and defense spending have positive but not
significant coefficients, confirming the Harvey & Leybourne (2007) test statistic. As a consequence, the
estimations suggest that while total government spending and civilian spending have complementary
effects on private investment, military and defense spending have to be considered as unproductive and
variations in the latter variables are not able to impact on the growth rate of per-capita GDP in Italy.
Hence, in line with a peace dividend hypothesis a shift of resources from military sector to civilian
spending may be able to stimulate growth.
Table 5 shows the post estimation tests. The results do not highlight shortcomings concerning the
proposed estimations. In particular, non-linearity tests suggest the absence of residual non-linearity after
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Table 4: Estimation results of the Smooth Transition Regression model for government spending, military spending and
defense spending
I II III
Linear part
Constant 8.796 *** 8.722 *** 8.751 ***
(0.709) (0.722) (0.725)
Trend -0.157 *** -0.152 *** -0.153 ***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.023)
d1970 -4.737 *** -4.789 *** -4.769 ***
(1.018 ) (1.034 ) (1.036 )
d2009 -3.004 *** -2.922 ** -2.985 **
(1.134) (1.133) (1.128)
γt−1 -0.386 *** -0.381 *** -0.384 ***
(0.100 ) (0.100 ) (0.100 )
d.invt 1.383 *** 1.364 *** 1.370 ***
(0.189) (0.196) (0.197)
Non-linear part
Constant -15.785 *** -16.848 ** -16.537 **
(5.364 ) (6.801 ) (6.585)
η 8.595 6.813 7.330
(7.617) (5.777) (6.577)
c 36.206 *** 36.155 *** 36.225 ***
(0.976 ) (1.237) (1.148)
govt−1 0.372 **
(0.129)
milt−1 1.341
(2.361)
non milt−1 0.343 **
(0.152 )
deft−1 0.941
(1.997)
non deft−1 0.361 **
(0.142)
Estimation diagnostic
R2 0.888 0.889 0.888
adjusted R2 0.890 0.891 0.891
SD of transition variable 7.972 7.972 7.972
SD of of residuals 0.949 0.959 0.960
Note: The dependent variable is the per-capita growth rate in GDP. In parenthesis we report
standard errors. The variables (η) and (c) are the estimated initial values for the maximum-
likelihood estimation. At the bottom of the table are also listed several measures of estimation
accuracy (Granger & Tera¨svirta, 1993).
that total government spending is used to describe the transition in the LSTR(1) model.
Finally, Table 6 reports the main findings from the estimations of equation (9) as specified in equation
(21). As previously, diagnostic estimation accuracy measures are reported at the bottom of the table. The
first two columns of Table 6 account for military spending in the whole sample and in the sub-sample
1986-2009, the next two consider the same distinction for defense spending, whereas the last column
proposes the estimates for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions (mil peacet), in the available period
1986-2009. The estimates use the same specification of Table 4.
As showed by the first two columns of the table, we find a strong positive effect of military spending
on the growth rate. The magnitude of the coefficient of milt−1 is about 2.5 percentage points and
decreases when the estimation is carried out in the sub-sample 1986-2009 (about 1.8). On the contrary,
when defense spending is taken into account, our estimations (column III and IV) do not give significant
outcomes either for full or sub-sample estimates. These outcomes suggest that there is a positive impact
within military spending of that part of expenditure devoted to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions
which reduce the effects of external threats. This result is emphasized in column V, where the share
of military spending in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions is analyzed. The column shows that
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Table 5: Estimation checks for the Smooth Transition Regression model
Total government spending
Tests for q − th order serial correlation
q 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
p− value 0.259 0.135 0.279 0.236 0.283 0.389 0.107 0.040
Tests for parameter constancy Tests for remaning non-linearities
p− value 0.212 0.309 0.422 0.512 0.060 0.925 0.236
Military and non-military spending
Tests for q − th order serial correlation
q 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
p− value 0.2038 0.1475 0.2999 0.2516 0.3074 0.4202 0.1591 0.0826
Tests for parameter constancy Tests for remaning non-linearities
p− value 0.281 0.459 0.663 0.222 0.056 0.623 0.025
Defense and non-defense spending
Tests for q − th order serial correlation
q 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
p− value 0.2412 0.1511 0.3055 0.2142 0.2451 0.3612 0.1393 0.0626
Tests for parameter constancy Tests for remaning non-linearities
p− value 0.151 0.277 0.575 0.409 0.023 0.061 0.265
Note: the Table reports the post-estimation test statistics from the STR model presented in Table 4. These tests statistics
consider the autocorrelation in the residual, the constancy of the estimated parameters, and the absence of non-linearity after
estimation, as described in section 4.2.1.
military spending in peacekeeping missions has a significant and large in magnitude coefficient close to
the 3 percentage points.
6. Some concluding remarks and policy implications
This paper has investigated the effect of military sector on economic growth in Italy. The proposed
analysis may serve to foster the debate on the role of military sector in the current society and contributes
to the policy intervention aimed to increase the efficiency of government spending. By extending previous
works on the optimal size of government expenditure, the proposed analytical framework explores how
external threat affects the preferences of the representative household and, in turn, stimulates economic
growth. The comprehensive model is then able to capture two different effects of military sector on
economic growth, one depending on the complementarities with private investments and the share of
government expenditure and one through a greater perceived security of consumers.
Post World War II Italian data are used to estimate nested non-linear growth models using time-
series semi-parametric methods. The estimates show that total government and civilian burdens are
productive, whereas military burden has significant effects on economic growth, promoting ”productively”
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions which reduces the insecurity from the external threat. Robust to
the proposed specifications, these results show that a reduction of military burden in favoring government
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resources to the civilian sector enhances economic growth by the complementarities that this spending
has on the private inputs.
As a first suggestion for the political economy, the evidence is concordant to recognize for military
spending a role in enhancing economic growth, although this role is not the one based on the spillover
effects on economy or positive externalities by human capital discussed above. This role is linked to the
reduction of the level of external threat that peacekeeping and humanitarian missions determined. In
fact, military spending is, at least for Italy, a deterrent for external attacks and serves to maintain far
sources of instability that may affect the perception of consumers and the propensity to consume.
However, this evaluation depends on the dimension of peacekeeping mission participations and from
the allocation of public resources. The global recession and financial crisis started in 2008 has focused
attention on the efficiency of the public sector in order to reduce public debt and to foster economic
growth. The recent spending review promoted by the Italian government is in accordance with the
inefficiencies of the military sectors (or less efficiency with respect to civilian expenditure), with the
idea of a massive cut on personnel expenditures and investments. The reduction of the commitment in
buying the F-40 airplanes represents an example of the revision of the optimal allocation of government
spending without that the perception of security of the Italian citizens were affected.
Of course, the instability of the Mediterranean region, where the Italy is positioned, does not ensure
a permanent security in the region, which in the future may further require interventions of the Italian
military forces. For example, the onset of the African immigration on the Italian seaboard from 2009
has determined massive landings in Sicily that currently has not been solved in the international offices.
People from different African country are potentially recognized as refugees or similarly from Italian law
and generally enter with temporary permits. This may prefigure in the future an use of government
funds for ”humanitarian missions” in the home country to select who is eligible for the residence permit
and who not, although it could conduct toward a distortion of money with respect to more productive
expenditures, an issue that the right political part in Italy has already brought to the attention of
voters. On the other hand, following the results of the paper, the absence of this ”military spending”
for motivations that are linked with the security could bring to a fall of the future growth rate.
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